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Abstract  
 In this article the alleged demise of the United States of America 
(USA) and the ability of its challengers will be discussed and analyzed. 
Based on George Modelski’s concept of Long-Cycles in Global Politics we 
can anticipate a disruption in the hegemonic position – currently held by the 
USA. Considering, the possibility of this scenario, the author executed a 
pragmatic comparative study and sketches out the chances for the two main 
competitors – China and India – which struggle mightily with domestic 
issues and on the other side presents four arguments, why the decline of the 
USA is not as apparent and looming as partly presumed. The arguments are: 
(i) the independence supply of natural resources; (ii) its supremacy over the 
world seas; (iii) reinstated activity in the Rimland and (iiii) control over the 
Global Commons. 
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Introduction 
 The international (and in many cases national) politics in last century 
have been dominated by the United States of America (USA). The United 
States (US) have gained this status with its victorious involvement in the 
Second World War (Wallerstein, 2003) or latest with the end of the Cold 
War, when it became the sole superpower in the world. In this period, it 
played an important role in maintaining world order, secured a framework 
for international transactions with its currency (Mandelbaum, 2006). These 
positive aspects of fulfilling a world governance role are also accompanied 
by more negative ones which evolve around the mingling of domestic issues 
of other states culminating in military interventions (e.g. Meernik, 2004). 
Nevertheless, at the current point of time, the US seems to remain in this 
position. However, latest with the election of President Trump the question 
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whether the time of its hegemony is over, can be asked again.1 Is the US a 
staggering giant that just waits to be tipped over by the Republic of China or 
a combination of new rising powers? Next to the extremely quickly growing 
economies and populations in China and India one can swiftly revering to the 
financial crisis of 2008, the divided population, several unsuccessful military 
interventions and Russia’s seemingly successful stand up in the Ukraine 
Crisis when it comes to the symptoms of America’s decline. It is not possible 
to ignore these facts when one tries to diagnose US’ capability of keeping its 
position. However, a sharp reader might have been guessed, that opinion 
these factors might only gradually influence and shape the outcome of the 
upcoming years, decades or even centuries. The US’ decline is not at all as 
obvious as it might be presented. Several factors, such as the uncontested 
domination of the world oceans, the complete domination of the latest global 
common – the internet, its shaping ability to supply itself with fossil energy, 
and lastly its soon to be reintroduced influence in the Rimland. The United 
States is virtually uncatchable in these fields in the next century. All these 
aspects will be analysed below.  
 Next to the US’ persisting dominance and exertion of influence one 
has also consider the potential of the contestants to take over and fulfil the 
requirements of a world hegemon. Most recently the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, 
India, China, South-Africa) coalition gets identified as the only real threat for 
the US' throne (e.g. Hung, 2017:639). Even though at the moment equipped 
with limited political power the organization combines four of the fastest 
growing economies and an old superpower that wants to regain its position at 
the top of the international order.2 It is hard to asses, which power this 
coalition will possess in the future but it appears more a question of where 
China and India want to go instead of what a BRICS coalition would be able 
to achieve. Both of them had absolutely staggering economic growth rates in 
the past3 and will most likely continue to grow in a similar manner. They 
boast the biggest populations in the world and are also aware of their 
potential place in the world. Potential is also the factor, where those two 
stand out in this group and therefore the reason why I reckon to focus on 
these two when it comes to competitors of the US hegemonic position. The 
bygone developments of India and China are obviously undeniable and very 
                                                          
1 Also asked here: Layne 2009, Komlosy, 2016. 
2 Where India's and China's extreme growth is beyond doubt, Brazil and South 
Africa had a rather stagnated growth rates in the last three years (Brazil: between 1.0% and 
2.7%, S.-A.: 1.9% and 3.1%). Russia's growth rates except for 2013 (0.7%) are also pointing 
on a significant economic growth (World Bank, 2014). However, it is not really an emerging 
power, due to its history. 
3 They found themselves in the high single digit area after years and years of double 
digit growth rate. 
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impressive, but are we not a little bit quick to assume that the future 
development will continue in a similar smooth and successful way? Even if 
the projections are being fulfilled and China's and India's economy will 
overcome the US' one it is not being said that this will be enough to contest 
US's position. Moreover, the Asian powers have to overcome several 
growing pains in the process that are endangering the continued positive 
development. In the near future both countries have to take care of increasing 
domestic issues (secession, growing middle class as well as growing 
poverty), and the border dispute that weakens a potentially very strong 
alliance between those two.  
 This article aims to analyse, why the notion of an US decline might 
be premature, for once due to its continuing domination of crucial elements 
and secondly due the potential shortcomings of the contestants. In the course 
of the article I will firstly introduce the concept of a world hegemon using 
Modelski’s Long-Cycles in Global Politics Model and explain why a 
potential change of hegemony might be imminent. Secondly, while using a 
pragmatic study method and relying on secondary sources, the article will 
examine the hinted issues of the contestants. Hereby, a larger focus will be 
put on China since I consider the domestic problems of both countries as 
similar and deem China's chances to be a real challenger for more likely. At 
last, the article will outline why the US' role is not declining at all within the 
next decades and possibly in the next century and therefore most projections 
of the ‘Chinese century’ (Fishman, 2004) might have been premature. Here, 
(1) the future independence of natural resources, (2) the domination of the 
world seas, (3) the continuous contestation of the Rimland and at last (4) the 
control over the Global Commons will be brought forward.  
 
Theory section: A World Hegemon 
 At first, a short explanation of the world hegemon concept. This idea 
is based around George Modelski’s concept of ‘Long-Cycles in Global 
Politics’ (1987). According to that model we can observe that a critical 
element of world politics in the modern era is the rise, decline and succession 
of world powers (Portugal/Spain, Dutch Republic, Britain Twice, and the 
United States), which has been occurring in intervals of about 80-120 years 
(1987:3). Each transition has been on an occasion for contested challenge, 
which puts the US’ claim for hegemony around the First or the Second 
World War when they detached Britain from the leading position. Modelski 
states further that the world power is equipped with the single leadership in 
global politics, which is based on the global reach (command of the sea), the 
leading economy, an open society (democratic potential and also the capacity 
to forge coalitions within and without political compliance) and the ability to 
respond to world opinion with innovative policies (Modelski, 1987:10). 
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Some might argue that the United States does not fulfil all of these criteria 
and they are therefore already headed south. However, in the analysis below 
we will see that the US is clearly in control of these factors and therefore 
very likely to be able to hold to its hegemonic position. Nevertheless, 
according to Modelski’s model the challenge of the US’ supremacy looms in 
the very near future and is therefore a worthy field of research.  
 
Challengers 
 Now to the possible contestant before other factors that speak for a 
continuation of US supremacy will be scrutinized. It has been established, 
that a possible contestant can only rise out of the Asian continent. This thesis 
has found regular approval latest since Jim O’Neill’s coined the term BRICs 
in 2001 and predicted an economical power shift towards the second-tier 
nations within the next 50 years (2001). O’Neill predicted that based on total 
GDP these four nations (Brazil, Russia, India and China) will be wealthier 
than most of the current major economic powers. These predictions are based 
on the annual growth rates of the national economies in which regards 
especially China and India stick out with rates of 5.6% respective 5.9% (in 
2010). Considering, that these growth rates stay considerable stable China is 
expected to overtake the U.S. as the leading economic power in 2032 
(Dadush and Stancil, 2010:10). This is of course, one of the main arguments 
to proclaim China as the most likely contestant. Other ideas revolve around a 
BRIC coalition that will ultimately challenge the U.S. and lead us towards a 
multipolar world. 
 
Domestic Issues 
 There is no doubt that the rapidly growing economies of the BRIC 
(and also other non-G7 nations) will equip them with greater power to 
influence the current order. Albeit, China and most potential BRIC based 
coalitions have some growing pains to overcome before they constitute a real 
threat to the United States. Looking for example at China (note that similar 
problems apply for India) – the main competitor – we would have to 
consider the political instability of this vast country. Susan Shirk calls this 
‘internal fragility’ (2013:3) which is caused by domestic threats such as rapid 
economic rise, social inequality, environmental damage and government 
corruption. Additionally, Beijing faces domestic problems with secessionist 
movements and the maintenance its political legitimacy (He, 2014)4. Chinese 
officials have realized that the communist mantra will not anymore keep the 
population in line and are now promoting a mixture of ancient Chinese 
                                                          
4 The official communist ideology does counter the current capitalist economy, 
which also questions the justification for the one-party rule.  
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philosophy and nationalism to remain in power. Naturally, this is a process 
that cannot be done overnight and does furthermore heavily contradict with 
claims and ideas of secessionist regions such as Xinjiang, Tibet and Inner 
Mongolia (Lee, 2014). The Han idea and the secessionist movements are 
hereby highly linked since more secessionist activity will be answered with 
an increased focus on Han nationalism and an increased focus on Han 
nationalism will increase secessionist activities vice versa. Lee points out 
further that it looks like that Han-Nationalism indeed brought some positive 
effects to the Chinese situation (2014:5). Namely, the social construction of 
Xi's political legitimacy in the power transition, which showed that China's 
confidence to get involved in international relations grew even though being 
equipped with its own political system and the one-party rule. This 
development is especially visible to China's population and enhances 
political credibility and internal stability (Lee, 2014:5). Han-Nationalism was 
also able to hide the biggest domestic problems such as housing prices, 
unemployment issues, income inequality, corruption and people's mistrust 
toward the local governments, by promoting anti-corruption campaigns and 
directing the media spotlight to great national achievements and reshuffles 
national priorities more in favour of the government (Lee, 2014:5). However, 
this is not the whole story. A major negative effect is the above already 
mentioned aggravation of the internal ethnic conflicts (Lee, 2014:5). Han-
Nationalism does not at all appeal to the Islamic Uyghur people.  In these 
areas it does not have the ability to hide away the socioeconomic 
shortcomings. the pervasive nationalistic sentiments activate Uyghur jihadist 
even more which already resulted in multiple bloodshed and nationwide 
terrorist attacks which extremely threatens China's internal stability (Lee, 
2014:5). 
 Another domestic problem constitutes the high poverty rate. 10% of 
the population lives in extreme poverty (under 1.08$/day), even though 
China managed to decrease this number heavily between 1981 and 2004 
when it sunk from 64% to aforesaid 10% (Chen and Ravallion, 2008:2). But 
these numbers include only the very poorest. According to the World Bank 
around 28% of the population has under 2$ a year (2009). That means even 
if the predicted dramatic increases of total GDP occur the GDP per capita in 
the US will be still three times that of China and eight times that of India 
(Dadush and Stancil, 2010:11). This discrepancy arguably speaks essentially 
for a stronger U.S. economy. Beyond that, a growing GDP/capita usually 
goes along with the process of democratization (Wucherpfennig and 
Deutsch, 2009:2). The study says that, if the middle class grows and the 
monetary inequality within a country shrinks, experience suggests that 
democratic developments are about to start. Even though this theory might 
lack enough proper examples to fully support it, it cannot be denied that a 
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bigger middle class, with more access to education, travel and leisure has the 
potential to develop regime antagonistic ideas and pursue those. The call for 
democracy and liberal rights will most probably lead to public discussions, 
claims and form an inner problem that needs to be considered and could 
conceivably question the leadership and then again cater for internal 
instability.  
 At last, China's immense environmental problems need to be 
considered. The causes are on hand found on the extreme exploitation of its 
natural resources, due to the rapid economic development. The supply and 
demand for natural resources got heavily out of balance and will not only 
slow down the economic development in the future but obviously also 
creates environmental problems. The other factor for the environmental 
issues are to be found in the rapid urbanization of China. At this point 
approximately 40% of China's population lives in a city (1980: ~20%) and 
the ongoing urbanization rate is 1%, which means that 13 million people 
move to a city annually (Fu, et al., 2007). Both of these circumstances are 
co-responsible for China's highly polluted air, water shortage and 
contamination and are in general a damage to human health, create social 
conflicts and economic loss (Fu, et al., 2007). To be quite clear, a lot of 
people die every year from the shortage of clean water, from indoor air 
pollution5, from food shortcomings or intoxication (e.g. Mercury). 
Environmental deterioration is further one of the main reasons for social 
unrest (~51,000 disputes in 2005) and the economic losses due to pollution 
and ecological damage are estimated to be 7-20% of the annual GDP (Fu, et. 
Al, 2007). These domestic problems are only a handful of issues China has to 
solve in the next years and decades to not let unstable domestic politics 
interfere with the international rise. 
 
Sino-Indian Border 
 Potential domestic problems aside there are other issues that might 
compromise the chances for the dominance of a BRIC-based coalition. One 
of the biggest doubts arises when we examine the inter-BRIC connections of 
its two most important members. Yes, the BRICS countries (South-Africa 
was included in 2010) formed a formal association that not only promotes 
and encourages the economic, political and cultural cooperation between 
these nations but also the idea of a multipolar world (Laïdi, 2012). However, 
the association is far away from being a political united and influential body 
similar to the European Union. At this point it would be unwise to state that 
the political cooperation inside this group cannot increase towards an EU 
                                                          
5 A problem in rural China, where highly polluted biomass and coal is used to heat or 
cook inside (Fu, et al.,2007). 
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like level, especially considering the young age of the association, but some 
disagreements between the members might aggravate the process and 
eventually BRICS’s power. However, arguably one of BRICS strengths is its 
regional outspread and the possibility to act trans-regional. One of its biggest 
weaknesses on the other hand is based on the proximity of its two main 
players. It is most important for a strong BRICS coalition that China and 
India are able to eliminate their border disputes (including military 
incursions). The reasons for the ongoing conflict might be found in the 
internal problems of both states. Fravel argues that if leaders face internal 
threats they are very likely to use their foreign policy to deviate these 
(2005:52). Persisting territorial disputes are exactly the right issue to focus 
on. It seems unlikely that these disputes will come to an end in the near 
future, since increased cost connected with an active conflict, its escalation 
and the military defeat would most likely cause more internal risks.6  
 Furthermore, it is necessary that China cuts its growing ties with 
India’s archenemy Pakistan and stops (or at least reduces) its military and 
economic activities in the Indian Ocean/South Chinese Sea (String of 
Pearls). Afridi and Bajoria describe the relationship between China and 
Pakistan not only as mutually beneficial but also as a strategic hedge against 
India (2010). China has been one of Pakistan's major arms supplier and 
collaborated in military personnel training, joint exercises and intelligence 
sharing (Afridi, Bajoria, 2010). However, at this point times might change, 
with China becoming more and more aware that its Uyghur problem might 
be highly connected with Pakistan. The increasing level of extremism inside 
of Pakistan, which does not only lead to recruitment of Uyghur fighters but 
also created a safe haven for Uyghur jihadists in Pakistan's tribal areas, 
makes Beijing warry (Afridi, Bajora, 2010). Sino-Pakistani cooperation is 
also traceable in China's String of Pearls, which has been described by 
Pehrson as:  
‘[a] manifestation of China's rising geopolitical influence 
through the efforts to increase access to ports and airfields, 
develop special diplomatic relationships, and modernize 
military forces that extend from the South China Sea 
through the Strait of Malacca, across the Indian Ocean and 
on to the Arabian Gulf’ (2006:1). 
 The pearls are used by China to exert great power of the ocean and 
its sea lines of communication (SLOCs) which brings economic advantages 
to China but also threatens the regional demands of India (e.g. Khurana, 
                                                          
6 Since the upkeep of these disputes might actually be beneficial to both regimes it is 
questionable if their existence actually decreases or blocks the cooperation of India and 
China. In fact, this condition might actually speak for the exact opposite and for a sort of 
mutually beneficial cooperation.  
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2008). Beyond that, it creates a security dilemma for the Indian state. It is 
mostly based on the deep-rooted suspicion between these two states and the 
Chinese ties with other South-Asian and Indian Ocean states. A security 
dilemma usually arises when one state cannot provide its own security 
without searching for a superior power to protect it (Garver, 2002:1). 
Observing India's recent behaviour – seeking regional or even international 
partners in the form of Japan (e.g. Naidu, 2005) and the US7 - which on one 
hand could relieve the security concerns but on the other hand heat up the 
relationship with China as a traditional Japan antagonist.  
 The Cross-linked alliances and partnerships all around the Eastern- 
and South-Asian region seems to be the biggest problem and powder barrel 
of an effective cooperation between the two continental Asian major powers. 
National interest and power play are still dictating the daily politics and we 
can observe partnerships that are mostly based on the containment of the 
other instead of mutual benefits.8 It does not seem like this situation will 
change in the near future and both states are to be viewed as an independent 
player. Nevertheless, a harmonized South-Asian alliance would constitute an 
immense threat to the current world order. However, the possibility of a 
power shift might be not as obvious and inevitable as commonly understood. 
 
United States of America 
 There is not only scepticism appropriate when it comes to the rise of 
US’ challengers but also to the arguable inevitable decline of the United 
States’ power. In the following four arguments will be outlined, that describe 
why the US has a rather good chance of prolonging its stand as the world 
hegemon for at least another century.  
 
The Future Independence of Natural Energy Sources 
 A concern of US policymakers has been since the Second World War 
the country’s supply of gas and oil. The need made its foreign policy weaker 
and more predictable and has been clearly expressed in the foreign policy 
approach to the Middle East in the last century (Shwadran, 1985). However, 
with the Shale Revolution and other technical achievements the US will be 
(and does already) increase domestic oil and gas mining. Especially the 
untouched amount of gas (estimations start at 11 trillion cubic meters), which 
will be able to produce electricity and to substitute gasoline and diesel in 
vehicles, will become a powerful resource (Deutch, 2011:89). This will also 
make their natural resources supply independent from other states and does 
                                                          
7 Other options are e.g. a democratic alliance between India, Japan, USA and 
Australia, or India teaming up with India to pressure the common enemy Pakistan (as 
described in: Tow and Acharya, 2007).  
8 Though, where is the difference here?  
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decrease the importance of classical gas supplying countries such as Iran, 
Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia and Turkmenistan (Deutch, 2011:82). This also 
means another increase in the relevance of the United States. Beyond, that it 
will lead to a stabilization of the world oil price (Brown and Yücel, 2013). 
Out of this the US’ foreign policy can finally act unattached from the fear of 
supply shortcomings. This will not only lessen the vulnerability of its 
economy to oil price shocks but also change its foreign policy approach, 
where it can act more aggressive and shift its focus and priorities, away from 
the Middle East and Europe - where Russia does not necessarily will 
continue to dominate the European gas market if the US could emerge as a 
new supplier -  towards the new battlefield in the Pacific region.  
 
The US’ Domination of the World’s Seas 
 ‘Great is the power of the country that controls the sea’. Those were 
the words that Thucydides put in the mouth of Athens’ great commander 
Pericles in the eve of the Peloponnesian War. This ancient Greek predicate 
shall be proven correct in the following centuries and millennia in which sea 
domination has not only been the guarantor but main indicator for world 
rule. In charge of the world’s seas a power commands the mobility to project 
and protect power all over the globe (see also: Mahan, 1890). In our times, 
no vessel is better made for this endeavour than an aircraft carrier, which 
tend to appear at the coasts of states that are acting not conforming to the 
U.S. suggestions. This is where the magnitude of the U.S. dominance 
becomes highly visible. According to Globalsecurity.org, the US fleet does 
not only boast 19 aircraft carriers (the rest of the world has 12 combined) but 
by far the largest and technologically advanced (2014). China, the main 
competitor will have two models on the water by 2020. However, one carrier 
is an ex-Soviet model that has been purchased from the Ukraine in 1998 and 
started its sea trials in 2011 after lengthy refurbishing and its newest model is 
already obsolete before its maiden voyage (Roggeveen, 2018). At the 
moment the United States is building three new nuclear-powered aircraft 
carriers which are all scheduled to be commissioned by 2025 (O’Rourke, 
2014). According to the Congressional Research Service every ship will cost 
between $11Billion and $13Billion and take between seven and eight years 
to be constructed (O'Rourke, 2014). This will not only cement the dominance 
of the US Navy but shows how costly and tedious an aircraft carrier program 
of a competitor would be to overtake the United States in this sector. 
 
US’ Reinstated Activity in the Rimland 
 With the complete withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan 
the US is officially giving up its presence and military influence in the 
region. Afghanistan, devastated from the lengthy war will be left behind as a 
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failed state and it is expected that another big power (China) will interlude 
and benefit immensely from the won influence in the region. The US’ lost 
interest in the region could have arguably had an influence on the though 
long debated but initially did not execute an intervention in Syria, which 
would have prolonged US influence. However, speculations on this can be 
put to rest, with the news of the US troops landing in Syria (Gibbons-Neff et 
al., 2018). However, why is this region so important if, as I pointed out 
above, the United States is not interested anymore in the oil reserves and 
therefore helpful influence in the region? An explanation can be found in 
Spykman’s words: ‘Who controls the Rimland controls Eurasia, who controls 
Eurasia controls the contents of the world’ (1944, italics added). Afghanistan 
and the Middle East are a part of the Rimland, which extends from Europe’s 
coastlines over the Balkans to South-East Asia. One might argue that the US’ 
Foreign policy after WWII was based on keeping other powers out of this 
territory (from the Korean War, to Vietnam, Turkey’s admission to NATO, 
the Balkan wars and multiple involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq) to ensure 
that nobody else obtains this favourable position. Nevertheless, the recent 
fading involvement might be put aside considering the recent news 
mentioned above. It has been pointed out that the hotbed of the group lay in 
several other challenges of the region – the ongoing civil war in Syria being 
the biggest – and without addressing them other counter measures are going 
to be unsuccessful (Watts, 2014). ISIS and the Assad Regime have already 
shown that the U.S. strategies do not have the desired effects and with 
extended duration of the conflict it seems rather likely that the U.S. and its 
allies need to address the roots of the problem. This does not only ask for 
boots on the ground but for a long-lasting mission which provides the US 
renewed presence and influence in the region. 
 
US’ control over the Global Commons 
 The Global Commons are typically described as international or 
global resource domains in which common resources are found and no clear 
territorial ownership is established (see e.g.: Buck, 1998). They classically 
include open waters, shared natural resources (deep-sea), the polar regions, 
the atmosphere, outer space and most recently added cyberspace. Since the 
successful lunar race in the 1960′s the US holds a clear advantage in sea, air 
and space and have the unrestricted freedom of action. When the internet 
started its commercial success in the late 20th century nobody thought it 
seemed unimaginable that a single power could control this immense new 
landscape. After the revealing of Edward Snowden in the summer of 2013 
we know that it is possible. He showed us not only that the USA is capable 
of controlling and saving every internet connection that runs through their 
territory but also that the majority of the commercial internet connections 
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indeed run through the US mainland (Greenwald, 2013). Hereby, it does not 
matter if this is based on the monopoly position of American multimedia 
concerns since the physical linkages are under government control (it also 
does not matter if this was a coincidence or planned and supported by the US 
government). For clarification this means, that every message send through 
Facebook, every email addressed to a Gmail account and every file saved in 
iCloud (to only name a few) will first make its way through an submarine 
cable into a server in the United States and from there to the recipient 
(Gellman and Poitras, 2013). Snowden’s revelations showed us that the 
debate on a possible New Great Game on the internet supremacy is not only 
very out of time but already decided. Note further, that the domination of the 
cyberspace is even more empowering in our extremely technologized world 
that demands a 24/7 connection with the internet.  
 
Old, New, Changing Hegemony? 
 Not many will argue that the U.S.A. cemented themselves as the 
driving force of global politics. Small countries look up to them, await advise 
and that they lead the way. Greater powers have grown wary of the U.S. 
power but are more and more able to affront them on certain fields. At this 
point it is also no secret to anyone that Asia does not only outnumber them 
by population but will most certainly overtake the U.S. position as the 
leading economy in the next 20-30 years.   
 However, this is not the only factor, that is deciding when it comes to 
identifying the world hegemon. As pointed out above, the economic 
supremacy of China (and India) might not be as certain as commonly 
presumed. There are several domestic issues to overcome, which when 
unsolved will not only slow down the necessary developments but might 
even jeopardize those by the endangerment of internal stability, the 
legitimacy of the leadership and also the livelihood of the population. In 
addition, the biggest threat to the US supremacy would be constituted by a 
harmonic cooperation of the two biggest Asian players. However, due to a 
history of distrust, ongoing border disputes, security restraints and an 
ongoing non-compliance of partnerships and foreign policy India and China 
are not coming together in the near future.  
 But the continuation of the US supremacy is not solely based on the 
shortcomings of the contestants. As stated above, the US dominates every 
other very important aspect that is crucial for the hegemony. They will 
continue to remain the strongest military power by a great margin and to 
control the Global Commons (especially sea and cyberspace). It is most 
likely that their fossil energy supply for the next century is secured with 
resources on their own soil and ongoing tensions and conflicts in the Middle 
East will secure their influence and involvement in the Rimland. Apart from 
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these findings it is traceable that a transition period of global power is lying 
ahead. In fact, the US itself is aware of this and the recent focus away from a 
European towards a more Pacific oriented policy only proves this 
conjuncture (e.g. Clinton, 2011).  
 Concluding, the rise of other powers is undeniable – but so is the 
continuing domination of the United States of America. Challenge(r)s for its 
supremacy are imminent, but it is not very likely that the second half of the 
21st century will be dominated by another power than the United States. If 
we look back at Modelski’s model a repeat, as seen with Britain in the 19th 
century, is very likely. The only other plausible option, is the notion of a 
bi/multipolar world, very similar to the Spanish/Portuguese Period in the 16th 
century where two powers share the hegemonic role and divide power and 
influence amongst each other (Modelski, 1973). This scenario seems 
especially likely if the U.S. decides to focus more on its domestic policies (as 
demanded by a lot of its citizens), increases the Trans-Pacific cooperation 
even more and if the Asian powers are able to adapt to their upcoming 
challenges. If so, a shared US/Asia(China) hegemony might be able to take 
the current position of the United States..  
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